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In a global context characterized by growing greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions and higher 
CO2 concentrations in the atmosphere, there exists strong and increasingly convincing 
evidence that climate change is already having an impact in nearly all places on the globe 
and on a wide variety of natural and societal processes. When the Fifth Assessment 
Report (AR5) is finalized in 2014, the negotiations will be recalibrated in light of this new 
consensual knowledge base. As far as we can judge from the cumulative scientific 
evidence, attaining the 2°C goal will be highly unlikely unless there is a rapid and 
fundamental reversal in climate politics at the global level and in national policymaking. In 
fact, scientists of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change are calling for a peak in 
GHG emissions before 2020 and fast and deep cuts thereafter (IPCC 2007: 67). It is 
therefore no exaggeration to speak of this decade as the ‘pivotal decade’ in climate 
politics. A sense of urgency, hard and ambitious political commitments, the conclusion of 
a global deal, and practices of production and consumption adapted to the challenge are 
minimal requirements. This is beyond any doubt a daunting challenge and arguably one of 
a magnitude that humanity has never faced before. 
  
The following article is based on a book chapter, ‘The governance of climate relations between 
Europe and Asia in the ‘pivotal decade’ (2010–2020): evidence from China and Vietnam’, written 
by David Belis (Taishindo Services) and Hans Bruyninckx (University of Leuven). The chapter will 
appear in: H. Bruyninckx, Y. Qi, Q.T. Nguyen and D. Belis (eds). 2013. ‘The Governance of 
Climate Relations between Europe and Asia: Evidence from China and Vietnam as Key Emerging 
Economies. Cheltenham, UK and Northampton, MA, US: Edward Elgar Publishing (more info). 
Since the Copenhagen summit in 2009, negotiations on climate change have continued during 
annual Conferences of the Parties (COPs) and endless technical working groups with, as major 
results, the inclusion of the Copenhagen Accord in the regular process and the launch of the 
Durban Platform, promising a new global climate deal to be negotiated by 2015 and enter into 
force by 2020. In the ongoing process of regime formation, the European Union, China and the 
United States are the key actors, and it is the interaction between these traditional and emerging 
powers that will define the global architecture of climate governance in the decades to come. At 
least five obstacles can be identified, however, for the Durban train to reach its eventual 
destination. 
1. Firstly, the position of the US remains very difficult. It is hard to imagine that the country would be 
willing to accept any globally binding agreement during the next several years, regardless of the 
outcome of post-Obama or congressional elections. As long as the deeply embedded opposition 
to binding multilateralism remains a fact, and the power of socalled ‘energy states’ remains as 
strong as it is today in the political system, there is little hope for a large breakthrough. This 
immediately sets a limit on the expected outcome of global negotiations. A legally binding treaty 
with the necessary deep cuts in US emissions is not a realistic expectation. This means that the 
EU and China will have to be creative in forging a potential deal that is binding enough, yet 
acceptable for the US. 
2. Secondly, although China has positioned itself diplomatically as the major developing country in 
climate negotiations (within the G77) it will have to take the ‘big leap forward’ and become a 
major leader in forging functional agreements that include major and binding commitments by 
emerging economies and/or middleincome countries. China’s role of leadership in the coalition of 
the South (G77) will need to shift more convincingly towards visionary leadership on the role of 
these countries in global climate governance. Legitimate claims to discount the past (with historic 
high emissions in Western countries), and recognize different levels of development, should not 
obscure the fact that climate politics may be based on the past and present but are primarily 
aiming at the future. A climate agreement without strong commitments from China, India, Brazil, 
Indonesia, Turkey, Mexico, Thailand, South Africa, Argentina and a number of other countries is 
just as meaningless and a priori ineffective as one without the US. China, more than any other 
nonAnnex I country, realizes this and has the political weight to take the lead. Maturing diplomatic 
relations with BRIC/BASIC (Brazil, Russia, India, China / Brazil, South Africa, India, China) and 
G20 countries will be crucial for this task (without suggesting that these are necessarily the fora 
that will be most effective). 
3. Thirdly, China faces major challenges at the domestic level. The functioning of its current growth 
model leads to considerable social and environmental externalities, not least due to its large 
dependence on fossil fuels, with coal still accounting for 68.4 percent of total primary energy 
consumption in the year 2011 (National Bureau of Statistics of China 2012). The official discourse 
on environmental and climate change problems in China has changed dramatically over the last 
five years, though. The current FiveYear Plan (find the full English translation here) has 
materialized this in ambitious targets on some partial elements of climate change and energy 
policies. The ambition of the next FiveYear Plan should be the horizontal integration of climate 
change concerns in all of China’s core development, economic, energy, agricultural, transport 
and material infrastructure policies. This requires serious reconfiguration of domestic politics, but 
is the only guarantee for credible steps forward and forms the basis for meaningful international 
engagement. 
4. Fourthly, the position of the EU needs to be one of continued commitment to ambitious climate 
goals and innovative policymaking. The 202020 ambitions were only a first step and are in 
serious need of upscaling. The political process to bring 27 member states in line to do this is, 
within the EU context, at least as important as the EU’s role at the global level. The embedding of 
climate goals in longterm policy trajectories leading to a lowcarbon society and resource 
efficiency by 2050 has been an important and ambitious political step (see Roadmap for moving 
to a low-carbon economy in 2050). This now needs translation into credible and ambitious targets 
for the decades to come. Further horizontal integration of climate goals in all of the EU’s policy 
domains is a central element of this process. If the EU can take up this role, it will remain a leader 
in terms of policy development and commitment. This role is important as the EU is in and of itself 
a sort of laboratory for binding multilateralism. In addition, as one of the two large historic 
polluters, the EU has probably the largest leverage on the US. Climate diplomacy should figure 
high on the transatlantic diplomatic agenda. As the largest donor and trading partner for many 
developing countries, the EU is also in a position to use traditional instruments of trade and 
development in new and creative ways in light of future climate challenges for the developing 
countries. 
5. Fifthly, both China and the EU – in addition to the US – will have to play a central role in the 
debates about the financial aspects of climate governance. In the current world order, it is no 
longer acceptable that the traditional Bretton Woods institutions, which reflect the postSecond 
World War balance of power, would play the central role in the financial climate regime. They are 
subject to decades of criticism from developing countries and need to be rethought and 
restructured to become acceptable as the backbone for climate financing. Global financial 
governance in light of climate change is part of the reconfiguration of global institutions in which 
the US, the EU (more precisely its most important member states) and China all have their history 
and also their ambitions. Balancing those is an essential element of global climate diplomacy. 
This will necessarily include negotiations with the other members of the G20, and touching 
difficult issues such as legitimacy and transparency, as well as fairness, representation and 
effectiveness. 
Besides these elements, it is important to understand that the global architecture of 
environmental governance and climate governance is increasingly questioned. Its incremental, 
slow and largely ineffective nature (for example the US de facto not included, and no successor 
agreement for Kyoto; the fact that emissions keep increasing) is reflected in ‘expectation 
management’ ahead of the COPs of the UNFCCC. Although this is politically understandable, 
reforming the process and regaining the momentum is a primordial task for both the EU and 
China if this pivotal decade for climate change is going to take the right turn. If after decades of 
socalled Pax Americana we are moving into a Pax Climatica, China and Europe, in addition to the 
US, will have to provide exceptional leadership. Extending bilateral relations and building effective 
policy cooperation are the key building blocks of such strategic partnerships. 
David Belis is research consultant at Taishindo Services. He provides 
consultancy services to academic institutions and research associations. His main research areas 
are global climate and environmental governance, EU-Asia climate relations and urban 
environmental governance in the United States. Previously, he was Coordinator of the InBev-
Baillet Latour EU-China Chair at the Leuven Centre for Global Governance Studies and Research 
Fellow and Project Coordinator at the Faculty of Social Sciences, University of Leuven. He 
obtained a masters degree in Chinese Studies and International and Comparative Politics at the 
University of Leuven. 
The Governance of Climate Relations between Europe and Asia: Evidence from China and 
Vietnam as Key Emerging Economies will be published under the Edward Elgar’s Leuven Global 
Governance Series in 2013. 
 
